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ABSTRACT The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the 
‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour 
market in order to study the relation between tax compliance (both voluntary and 
enforced), tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm's decision to 
evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities, and affects one of the most 
important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to 
mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on voluntary and 
enforced compliance. The main result is that with the “right mix” of policy tools of 
deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, (voluntary) tax compliance increases 
and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the 
baseline matching model à la Pissarides (2000) in order to study the relation between 
tax compliance, tax evasion and unemployment. 
The “slippery slope" framework was born in the field of Economic Psychology to 
explain the high level of tax compliance rather than the high level of tax evasion, thus 
highlighting that: a) some tax compliance is voluntary and depends on trust in tax 
authorities; b) the standard mechanism of enforced compliance (monitoring 
probability and expected penalty)
1
 alone can not explain the overall tax compliance 
(Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008a; 2008b; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010).
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This theoretical work captures the importance of the interaction of power and 
trust for tax compliance. Also, it shows that the firm's decision to evade taxes also 
depends on trust in tax authorities, and affects one of the most important 
macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. The main result of this paper is 
that with the “right mix” of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is 
maximised, (voluntary) tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may 
also decrease unemployment. The “right mix” of policy tools of deterrence is defined 
as the level of authorities’ power that is high enough to foster belief in the 
effectiveness of their work but not so high that exertion of power corrodes trust. 
 
2. Model with tax evasion and unemployment 
We consider a basic matching framework à la Pissarides (2000) with a continuum of 
homogeneous workers of measure one. The creation of employment occurs in a labour 
market characterised by trading frictions due to costly and time-consuming matching 
of workers and firms. As usual (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), 
an aggregate matching function is used to summarise these frictions. Precisely, the 
number of job matches formed per unit of time is ( )vu,mm = , where u  is the number 
                                                 
1
 As in the traditional economic models of tax evasion à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For a review 
see Sandmo (2005). 
2
 The ‘slippery slope’ framework distinguishes two forms of tax compliance: voluntary and enforced 
compliance. Voluntary compliance depends on trust in tax authorities, whereas enforced compliance 
depends on the power of tax authorities to clamp down on tax evaders. Trust (in) and power (of) tax 
authorities, as well as their interaction, are decisive for tax compliance. 
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of unemployed workers and v  is the number of vacancies. The matching function is 
strictly increasing but concave in both arguments and displays constant returns to 
scale. It follows that the labour market tightness is given by v/uθ ≡ . Hence, 
( ) { } { }1θ1,m/vu v,mθq −=≡  and ( ) { } { }θ,1m/uu v,mθg =≡  are the probability of filling 
a vacancy and of finding a job, respectively.
3
 To ensure that unemployment exists in 
steady state, it is assumed that job destruction occurs at the exogenous separation 
rate δ . Therefore, in steady state the matching and job destruction rates allow us to 
obtain the steady state unemployment rate: 
( ) ( ) uθgu1δu ⋅−−⋅=& ( )( )θgδδ/u +=⇒                           (1) 
Obviously, the unemployment rate depends positively on δ  and negatively on θ . 
The value functions specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are: 
value of a vacancy:  ( ) ( )VJθqcrV −⋅+−=  
value of a filled job:  ( ) ( ) ( )JVδecweρwyτyrJ D −⋅+−−⋅−−⋅−= ϕ  
value of searching for a job: ( ) ( )UWθgbrU −⋅+=  
value of being employed: ( )WUδwrW −⋅+=  
where r is the exogenous discounted rate; c is the vacant job cost; y is the true 
productivity, while y
D
 is the declared one; τ  is the company (corporate) income tax; 
Dy-ye ≡  is the evaded income; w is the wage rate (tax-deductible); b is the benefit of 
being unemployed; ρ  is the rate whereby tax authorities detect tax evasion and levy 
the penalty φ , with τφ > ; ( )ec  is the concealment cost, with ( ) 0ec' > . Intuitively, 
the higher the evaded income, the greater the penalty and the concealment cost. 
Although the “original” slippery slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008a; 2008b) 
adopts an individual perspective (individual tax payers), modelling trust in tax 
authorities as a determinant of tax evasion makes sense even for small firms. Also, it is 
relevant for (the managers of) large or midsized firms. 
Firms' tax evasion decision is based on expected profits maximisation. Hence, 
the optimum amount of income tax evasion is obtained by the value of y
D
 which 
maximises the present value of a filled job, i.e.: 
( )ec'ρφτJmax
Dy
+=⇒






                            (2) 
                                                 
3
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . 
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unsurprisingly, at the optimum, the marginal tax saving has to equal the sum of the 
expected risk of tax evasion and the marginal concealment cost. It follows that there is 
no tax evasion if the expected risk is greater than or equal to the tax rate, i.e. if ρφτ ≤ , 
whereas, on the other hand, with ρφτ >  it is always optimal for firms to under-report 
income. We will concentrate on the non-trivial case where there is tax evasion (i.e. 
yyD < ), but it is not optimal for the firm to evade all of the income (i.e. 0yD > ). This 
implies that ρφτ >  and the concealment cost is convex, namely ( ) 0e'c' > . These 
assumptions enable us to obtain an interior solution with positive evaded income. 
As usual (see Pissarides, 2000), the equilibrium value of market tightness ( *θ ) 
is given by the value of a filled job under the free-entry (or zero profit) condition V = 0:  
( )
( ) ( )
( )δr
ecwτ1eρyτy
*θq
c
D
+
−⋅−−⋅−⋅−
=
ϕ
                                     (3) 
Note that a reduction in tax evasion (i.e. an increase in y
D
), increases market tightness 
and reduces unemployment, i.e. 0yθ/ D >∂∂ , if ( ) 0ec'ρτ- >++ ϕ , otherwise it 
reduces θ  and increases unemployment. Intuitively, if the level of taxation is lower 
than the cost of tax evasion, then to under-report income is not profitable for firms; 
also, with fewer taxes more vacancies will be posted by firms.
4
 
Finally, wage is the outcome of a bilateral matching problem described by the 
Nash bargaining solution, 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )VJβ1 βUWVJUWargmaxw β1β −⋅−=−⇒−⋅−= −                         (4) 
where ( )1 0,β∈  is the bargaining  power of workers. Obviously, 0θw/ >∂∂ . 
 
3. Extension to the ‘slippery slope’ framework 
In this extension of the baseline matching framework developed in the second section, 
we try to capture the importance of the interaction of power and trust for “overall” tax 
compliance, thus introducing the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework. 
The ‘slippery slope’ framework stresses the crucial interaction of power and 
trust (Kirchler et al., 2008a; 2008b; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). Indeed, empirical 
                                                 
4
 From a macroeconomic point of view, a higher tax evasion implies a larger shadow economy which 
damages economic growth (see La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Eventually, a lower growth lead to a higher 
unemployment. 
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analysis shows that trust and power positively influence tax payments; in particular, 
trust increases and power decreases voluntary compliance, whereas power increases 
and trust decreases enforced compliance (Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010). 
Following Muehlbacher and Kirchler’s (2010) insight, we assume that too 
frequent tax audits and rigorous penalties may corrode the trust of honest taxpayers in 
tax authorities, but at the same time, no audits at all may bring up doubts about the 
power of tax authorities and cause distrust in the effectiveness and credibility of tax 
authorities’ work. Formally, we assume that trust in tax authorities ( η ) is given by:
5
 
( )2ρφbρφaη ⋅−⋅=                  (5) 
with 0ba, > . In short, trust in tax authorities increases with the power of tax 
authorities until the latter becomes overwhelming. From that point onwards, trust 
decreases in power, ceteris paribus (see Figure 1). 
Trust in tax authorities
Tax audits 
and penalty
maxη
*ρϕ maxρϕ
 
Figure 1. The “slippery slope” of trust and power 
 
Therefore, the optimal level of policy tools of deterrence (penalty and 
monitoring rate), which maximises trust in tax authorities, is given by: 
                                                 
5
 One could assume that trust in tax authorities also depends on a parameter which takes into account 
the fact that not all firms share the same mentality to tax paying, i.e. not all of them react in the same 
way to measures of tax enforcement. This realistic hypothesis would not change the qualitative results 
of the analysis. 
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 { } ηmaxρφ 0ρφb2a0ρφ
η
=⋅⋅−⇒=
∂
∂
⇒
b2
a
ρφ*
⋅
=⇒             (6) 
Hence, the “turning point” for power depends on the parameters of trust in tax 
authorities’ reaction function. 
Furthermore, we assume that trust in tax authorities increases the size of 
declared income, since voluntary compliance is based on a trustful relationship 
towards tax authorities (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). Hence, let us treat y
D
 as a 
function of η : 
( )ηyy DD =                   (7) 
with 0η /yD >∂∂ , yy lim D
maxηη
<→  and 0y lim
D
0η >→ , since there is tax evasion, but it 
is not optimal to evade all of the income (see section 2). Hence, if the policy maker sets 
*ρφρφ = , then trust is maximised; vice versa, if *ρφρφ >  or *ρφρφ < , then trust is 
below the optimal level and thus the voluntary compliance is low. In particular, if 
*ρφρφ > , then power decreases voluntary compliance (since maxηη < ), while the 
maximisation of trust decreases enforced compliance, since ρφ  must be reduced (see 
Figure 1). The model is thus able to mimic the interaction between power and trust. 
As a result, with the right mix of policy tools of deterrence (penalty and 
monitoring rate), trust in tax authorities is maximised, voluntary tax compliance 
increases and thus a fair and profitable interaction between tax authorities and 
taxpayers could be achieved (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). Furthermore, if the 
power of tax authorities which maximises trust is such that ( ) τec'*ρ >+ϕ , then a 
decrease in tax evasion increases labour market tightness and decreases 
unemployment. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This theoretical paper introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework 
into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the 
relation between tax compliance (both voluntary and enforced), tax evasion and 
unemployment. It shows that the firm's decision to evade taxes also depends on trust 
in tax authorities, and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the 
unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between 
 7 
trust and power and its effects on voluntary and enforced compliance. The main result 
is that with the “right mix” of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is 
maximised, (voluntary) tax compliance increases, and a reduction of tax evasion may 
decrease unemployment. 
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